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determination of the proper event-either

the commission of the negligent act or the discovery thereof-which starts the
statute of limitations running against a medical malpractice action brings two
social policies into conflict. Statutes of limitations provide for the security of
transactions with the passage of time and thus protect defendants against the
difficulties inherent in litigating stale claims.' On the other hand, statutes of
limitations "represent expedients, rather than principles." 2 They should not be
used to deny just claims in a manner that cannot be reconciled with their traditional purpose, requiring "the assertion of claims within a specified period of
time after notice of the invasion of legal rights." This comment undertakes
to discuss the question raised where the negligent act might not be discovered
until the statute of limitations has run ;4 the problem that often arises when a
foreign object is left in a surgical wound.5
Most courts hold that the statute of limitations runs against malpractice actions from the commission of the negligent act. 6 However, in recent years,
several states have mitigated the harshness of this rule by adopting the "discovery" doctrine which provides that the statute of limitations does not commence until the injured party has, or reasonably should have, discovered his
injury. 7 This mitigation has been accomplished by construction of existing
* Roybal v. White, 383 P.2d 250 (N.M. 1963).
1. Wood, Limitation of Actions § 5 (1st ed. 1882). In Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944), the United States
Supreme Court said that statutes of limitations are designed to "promote justice by preventing surprises through revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."
2. Chase Secs. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
3. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949).
4. This comment will not cover the situation in which fraudulent concealment may
toll the statute of limitations as provided in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-7 (1953). In the
principal case, Roybal v. White, 383 P.2d 250 (N.M. 1963), fraudulent concealment
was not alleged in the complaint, and the court said that this could not be urged on
appeal.
5. For an example of another situation in which the damage from a negligent act
may not be discovered for several years, see City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306
(Fla. 1954), discussed in note 38 infra.
6. Carter v. Harlan Hosp. Ass'n, 265 Ky. 452, 97 S.W.2d 9 (1936) ; Swankowski v.
Diethelm, 98 Ohio App. 271, 129 N.E.2d 182 (1953) ; Murray v. Allen, 103 Vt. 373,
154 Atl. 678 (1931) ; Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash. 2d 675, 277 P.2d 724 (1954).
7. Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1953) ; Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944) ; Spath v.
Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173
A.2d 277 (1961) ; Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959) ; Ala. Code Ann.
tit. 7, § 25(1) (1958); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-584 (1960).
There are jurisdictions that have kept the statute of limitations in foreign objects
cases from starting to run at the commission of the negligent act on rationale other
than discovery. Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962) (statute of limitations did not start as long as there was con-
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statutes of limitations8 or by enactment of statutes of limitations which deal

specifically with malpractice actions and incorporate the discovery doctrine. 9
In Roybal v. White, 10 the plaintiff sought damages for malpractice arising
out of an operation performed upon her January 14, 1952, by the defendant
doctor. He allegedly left a sponge in the plaintiff's abdominal cavity which
resulted in surgery July 24, 1961. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint on the ground that her cause of action was barred by the statute of

limitations." On appeal to the Supreme Court of New Mexico, held, Aftinued treatment by same doctor) ; Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908
(1936) (statute of limitations did not start because there was said to be continuing
negligence until object was removed).
8. The following states have adopted the discovery doctrine by construing their
statutes of limitations for personal injuries (none of these states have statutes dealing
specifically with malpractice): Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d
445, 254 P.2d 85 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1953), construing Cal. Civ. Proc. § 340(3);
Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961), construing N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:14-2 (1952) ; Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959), construing Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).
The following states have adopted the discovery doctrine by construing their malpractice statutes of limitations: Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944),
construing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 87-1-6 (1953); Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38,
115 N.W.2d 581 (1962), construing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-208 (1956).
9. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 25(1) (1958) :
All actions against physicians and surgeons, and dentists for malpractice,
error, mistake, or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort, must
be commenced within two years next after the act or omission or failure
giving rise to the cause of action, and not afterwards. Provided that if the
cause of action is not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered within such period, then the action may be commenced within six
months from the date of such discovery or the date of discovery of facts which
would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier, provided
further that in no event may the action be commenced more than six years
after such act.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-584 (1960):
No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct,
or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, chiropodist, chiropractor,
hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within one year from the date
when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be
brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counter-claim may be interposed in any such action
any time before the pleadings in such action are finally closed.
10. 383 P.2d 250 (N.M. 1963).
11. The trial court held that the action was barred by N.M. Stat. Ann. §23-1-4
(1953), which provides that actions not otherwise provided for must be brought within
four years of the date of accrual of the cause of action. Record, p. 17, Roybal v.
White, 383 P.2d 250 (N.M. 1963). On appeal, the supreme court held that although
the trial court reached the right decision, it had based its decision on the wrong
statute. The supreme court held that the applicable statute was N.M. Stat. Ann.
§23-1-8 (1953),

which provides that actions for personal injuries must be brought

within three years of the date of accrual of the cause of action. Roybal v. White, 383
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firmed. 1 2 The statute of limitations is not to be construed to include the dis13
covery doctrine.
In Roybal, the supreme court said New Mexico follows the general rule that
"the mere fact that plaintiff was not aware of the existence or extent of his
injuries or his right of action for malpractice does not postpone the commencement of the statute of limitations." 1 4 In support of this rule, the court cited the
New Mexico case of Kilkenny v. Kenney 5 and three American Law Report
annotations. 16 In Kilkenny, the defendant allegedly failed to give the decedent
her insulin December 11, 1955. She then went into a diabetic coma which
caused total incompetence and her subsequent death December 2, -1958. The
supreme court held that the three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries 17 applied and that the plaintiff's complaint, filed November 12, 1959,
was not timely.
Kilkenny is easily distinguishable from Roybal on its facts. In Kilkenny, the
plaintiff was cognizant of the cause of action from the day that the injury occurred; in Roybal, the plaintiff was completely unaware of her cause of action
until several years after the statute of limitations had run. By the same token,
the American Law Report annotations,'8 cited by the court in Roybal in support of its rule, refer to the broad area of the statutes of limitations in the usual
malpractice situation, i.e., where the plaintiff is aware of his injury from the
day of the negligent act. Thus, in failing to discuss any of the cases that present
the "discovery" doctrine, 19 the court in Roybal did not face the issue the case
presented-may the remedy of an injured party be taken away from him before
he can show that an injury has occurred ?
P.2d 250, 251 (N.M. 1963). This mistake did not affect the outcome of the case since
the action was not brought within the limitation period, as defined by the supreme
court, of either statute.
12. The court also held that N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (8) (c) (1953) does not prohibit
raising the defense of the statute of limitations by a motion to dismiss under N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(12) (b) (6) (1953). Roybal v. White, 383 P.2d 250, 253 (N.M. 1963).
13. 383 P.2d at 252.
14. Ibid.
15. 68 N.M. 266, 361 P.2d 149 (1961).
16. Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961) ; Annot., 144 A.L.R. 209 (1943) ; Annot., 74
A.L.R. 1317 (1931).
17. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-1-1, -8 (1953) ;see note 11 supra.
18. See note 16 supra.
19. The court did cite four cases that the plaintiff relied on for support: Burton v.
Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934); Bathke v. Rahn, 46 Cal. App. 2d 694,
116 P.2d 640 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d
908 (1936) ; Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Ore. 559, 130 P.2d 944 (1942). Roybal v.
White, 383 P.2d 250, 252 (N.M. 1963). But as the court pointed out, these cases are
all distinguishable from Roybal on their facts. Further, these decisions do not adequately
present the discovery doctrine; rather, they are based on concepts of continuing negligence and fraudulent concealment. The court failed to cite, let alone discuss, several
cases presented by the appellent which do present the discovery doctrine. These cases
are listed in note 28 infra and discussed in some detail in the accompanying text.
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The Roybal court recognized its decision worked a hardship on the plaintiff but concluded that it is within the province of the Legislature, not the
courts, to alleviate this hardship.20 The court reached this conclusion by the
following thought process: (1) statutes of limitations are creatures of the
Legislature, not the courts;21 (2) the New Mexico statutes are not ambig20. Roybal v. White, 383 P.2d 250, 252 (N.M. 1963).
21. The Roybal court said:
'"* * * But the fact that hardship may result can furnish no warrant for
the courts to supply what the Legislature has omitted or to omit what it has
inserted. * * *'
383 P.2d at 252, quoting from Natseway v. Jojola, 56 N.M. 793, 799, 251 P.2d 274, 277
(1952).
A continuation of the Roybal court's quotation from Natse-way throws more light
on the matter. A more complete quotation from that case reads:
'1 * * But the fact that hardship may result can furnish no warrant for
the courts to supply what the Legislature has omitted or to omit what it has
inserted. Martini v. Kemmerer Coal Co., supra [38 Wyo. 172, 265 P. 707];
Chmielewska v. Butte & Superior Mining Co., supra [81 Mont. 36, 261 P.
616]. "What the Legislature intends is to be determined, primarily, by what it
says in the act. It is only in cases of ambiguity that resort may be had to
construction. Courts cannot read into an act something that is not within the
manifest intention of the Legislature, as gathered from the statute itself. To
do so would be to legislate, and not to interpret. There is no ambiguity in this
statute, and it neither requires nor admits of construction." De Graftenreid v.
Strong, 28 N.M. 91, [94,] 206 P. 694, 695.'
Natseway v. Jojola, 56 N.M. 793, 799, 251 P.2d 274, 277 (1952), quoting from Vukovich v. St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pac. Co., 40 N.M. 374, 379, 60 P.2d 356, 359 (1936).
Natseway held that the cause of action under New Mexico's wrongful death
statute (the wrongful death statute at the time of that case was N.M. Laws 1882, ch.
61, §§ 2, 9) arises when the tort is committed, not when the wrongful death occurs.
This is the same holding that was reached in Pukovich. The wrongful death statute
that was being interpreted in Natse-way said: "Every action instituted by virtue of
the provisions of this act must be brought within one year after the cause of action
shall have accrued, or after this act shall go into effect." N.M. Laws 1882, ch. 61, § 9.
This statute was interpreted to mean that the action must be brought within one year
from the date of the injury. This could mean that if the person died more than a
year after the injury, there was no cause of action. To alleviate this situation, the
Legislature, in 1953, extended the limitation period to three years, N.M. Laws 1953,
ch. 30, § 1; but the same problem remained: a person might not die for more than
three years after the injury. To eliminate this problem, the Legislature again amended
the statute. It now provides:
Every action instituted by virtue of the provisions of this and the preceding
section [22-20-1] must be brought within three [3] years after the cause of
action accrues. The cause of action accrues as of the date of death.
N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 202, § 1; see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-2 (Supp. 1963). (Emphasis

added).
Thus, the court's insistence in Natseway in interpreting the wrongful death statute
in the harsh manner described must have prompted the Legislature to make these
changes. In 1952, Justice Coors foresaw the inevitability of the Legislature reversing
the court when, dissenting in Natse-way, he said:
By a quotation from another case in the majority opinion [referring to the
one quoted previously in this footnote from Natseway] the Court indicates that
if its decision is unjust then it is for the legislature to change the statute. With

544
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(3) the statutes do not include the discovery doctrine; (4) this omission is significant-it means the Legislature intended the discovery doctrine
should not apply in New Mexico; (5) therefore, the doctrine does not apply
in New Mexico and will not apply until the Legislature amends the statute.
If there is no ambiguity in the statute, which would clearly leave no room
for application of the discovery doctrine, then, of course, there would be no
need to consider the doctrine in New Mexico. But is there no ambiguity in the
statute of limitations? It provides that actions may be brought "after their
uous;22

causes accrue . . . for an injury to the person . . . within three [3] years."' 23

The word "accrue" is ambiquous. An analogy to the history of the use of this
word in the wrongful death statute2 4 evidences this ambiguity. In Natseway v.
Jojola,25 a 1952 wrongful death action, the court impliedly held that the
word "accrue" is ambiguous and interpreted it to mean the statute of limitations 26 begins to run at the time of the negligent act, not at the date of death.
The Legislature disagreed with the court's interpretation of "accrue" and
amended the statute.2 7 The cause of action in a wrongful death case now "accrues" as of the date of death.
If, in Roybal, the court had considered the history of the wrongful death
such a suggestion I thoroughly disagree. The fault is with the Court and not
the legislature. The Court has erroneously misconstrued the plain and unambiguous language of the statute passed by the legislature and thereby has
rendered unjust decisions, refusing rights plainly granted by the legislative
act.
Shall the Court persist in its error until the legislature takes affirmative
action by a simple amendment adding to Sec. 24-102, New Mexico Statutes
1941 Annotated [N.M. Laws 1882, ch. 61, § 9], something like the following
words, to wit: 'Notwithstanding the erroneous and unjust decisions of the
Supreme Court of New Mexico the action mentioned in this section and in Sections 24-101 and 24-104, New Mexico Statutes 1941 Annotated [N.M. Laws
1882, ch. 61, § 2; N.M. Laws 1947, ch. 125, § 1], is intended and declared to
be a new cause of action unknown to the common law and it accrues on the
death of the decedent.' As the error is entirely the fault of the Court let us
correct our own mistake without compulsion from the legislature.
Natseway v. Jojola, 56 N.M. 793, 818, 251 P.2d 274, 290 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
The Legislature found it necessary to amend the statute. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 2220-2 (Supp. 1963).
22. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-1-1, -8 (1953).
23. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-1 (1953). (Emphasis added.) This section is to be read
in connection with each statute of limitations. It says: "The following suits or actions
may be brought within the time hereinafter limited, respectively, after their causes
accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially provided."
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-8 (1953) is the statute of limitations which the Roybal court
said applies to action "for an injury to the person."
24. See the history of the statute (presently N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-20-1 to -2 (1953,
Supp. 1963)) discussed in note 21 supra.
25. 56 N.M. 793, 251 P.2d 274 (1952).
26. N.M. Laws 1882, ch. 61, § 9.
27. N.M. Laws 1953, ch. 30, § 1 (amended by N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 202, § 1; see
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-2 (Supp. 1963)).
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statute, it could have logically concluded that there is ambiguity in the word
"accrue." In an action under the wrongful death statute, the plaintiff knows
that he has a cause of action after the party is injured; thus, there may be some
justification in running the statute from the date of injury. However, in the
foreign object situation, the plaintiff may have no idea that a cause of action
has accrued until the damage resulting from the negligent act is discovered.
This may take many years as shown in Roybal.
Since there is ambiguity under this analysis, there is a tenable basis for a
strong argument for incorporation of the discovery doctrine in the personal injury statute of limitations. However, the court did not make this kind of
analysis in Roybal, and the result is a more strained interpretation of "accrue."
The proposed interpretation of "accrue" and the adoption of the discovery
doctrine are supported by several well-reasoned cases from other jurisdictions
that were presented to the court in Roybal's appellate brief. 28 A brief discussion
of these cases follows.
In Fernandi v. Strully,2 the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the
New Jersey Legislature had never specified when a cause of action accrued
under its statute of limitations.30 The court held that since "accrues" is a
vague word it was the court's function to delineate the statute. 3 '
In dyers v. Morgan,3 2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overruled by implication a line of cases that followed the majority view.3 3 The court construed
the phrase in the statute of limitations, which states that a cause of action
accrues when "the injury was done,"' 3 4 to mean "when the act heralding a pos28. Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944) ; Fernandi v. Strully, 35
N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961) ; Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959).
29. 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961).
30. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (1952) :
Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act,
neglect or default of any person within this state shall be commenced within 2
years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued..
31. In Fernandi,the court, quoting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, stressed
that statutes of limitation, as all statutes, must be read in the light of reason
and common sense and that in their application they 'must not be made to
produce something which the Legislature, as a reasonably-minded body, could
never have intended.'
Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277, 283 (1961), quoting from Ayers v.
Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (1959).
32. 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959).
33. See Bernath v. La Fever, 325 Pa. 43, 189 At. 342 (1937) ; Comment, 64 Dick.
L. Rev. 173, 175-76 (1960).
34. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 34 (1953):
Every suit hereafter brought to recover damages for injury wrongfully
done to the person, in case where the injury does not result in death, must be
brought within two years from the time when the injury was done and not
afterwards; in cases where the injury does result in death the limitation of
action shall remain as now established by law.
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sible tort inflicts a damage which is physically objective and ascertainable. ' 3

5

In 1953, California liberalized the rule of Huysman v. Kirsch"0 to include the

discovery doctrine in foreign objects actions.3 7 In the following year, Florida
adopted the doctrine."8
The number of courts taking this position still is in the minority ;39 but especially in light of the Legislature's change in the wrongful death statute,40 the
35. Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788, 792 (1959). In Ayers, Justice
McBride, in a separate concurring opinion, said:
Statutes of limitations must be read in the light of this provision [Pa.
Const. art. 1, § 11: "All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due
course of law . ... "] for the running of time is not the only test of validity of
such statutes. They are desirable in that they prevent oppression by forbidding
plaintiffs to litigate stale claims and thus compel defense at a time when such
defense is no longer practicable and sometimes even impossible. Nevertheless,
the restrictions imposed may not be so arbitrary as to preclude a reasonable
opportunity for one who has been harmed to make his claim. If the legislature
were permitted absolute discretion it would not be merely regulating the
remedy but would be abolishing it ...
Although courts will not inquire into the wisdom of a statute, nevertheless,
they do have power to declare a statute unconstitutional as applied to a given
case, or, alternatively, to interpret the statute so as to include an essential requirement which would make its application constitutional ...
[Justice McBride concluded that] this is not judicial legislation but is
instead constitutional interpretation for without it the statute of limitations, as
applied to the facts of this case, would be unconstitutional.
154 A.2d at 794-95 (concurring opinion). (Emphasis the court's.)
A similar position was taken in the Colorado case of Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo.
363, 370, 149 P.2d 372, 375 (1944), where Justice Burke argued that in the foreign
object situation it is
impossible for plaintiff to sue within the limitation and it is a recognized
maxim that the law requires not impossibilities. A legal right to damage for
an injury is property and one can not be deprived of his property without
due process. There can be no due process unless the party deprived has his
day in court ....
This argument would be equally valid in New Mexico in view of N.M. Const. art.
2, § 18, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law; nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws."
36. 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
37. Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 354 P.2d 85 (1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1953). See also Hutcheson & Smedley, Statute of Limitations in California
Medical Malpractice Cases, 28 Ins. Counsel J. 269 (1961).
38. City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954).
Brooks is also noteworthy in that it presents a situation, other than a foreign object
case, where the discovery doctrine is applicable. The plaintiff was undergoing x-ray
therapy treatment for the removal of warts from her heel. At the time of the treatment
she was aware of nothing indicating any radiation injury. The court held that the
statute of limitations, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11 (1960), did not commence to run until the
plaintiff was first put on notice that she had sustained an injury or had reason to believe that her right of action had accrued.
39. Louisell & Williams, Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases JU 13.14-.64 (1960).
40. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-20-1 to -2 (1953, Supp. 1963).
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rising voice in support of the discovery doctrine at least should be given consideration by the New Mexico court.
A statute of limitations should allow a person his just remedies at law. However, there is middle ground giving the patient the maximum rights possible
41
while still affording the doctor the maximum protection against stale claims.
But if the Supreme Court of New Mexico firmly believes, as stated in Roybal
v. White, that the discovery doctrine cannot be adopted in New Mexico except
through legislative action, 42 then it is submitted that the Legislature should
adopt a malpractice statute of limitations similar to Alabama's 4a or, as it did
with the wrongful death statute of limitations, 44 specifically state when a cause
of action for personal injury accrues.
ROBERT J. WERNER

41. The Alabama malpractice statute is probably the best example. Ala. Code Ann.
tit. 7, § 25(1) (1958) ; see note 9 supra.
42. If the Legislature amends the statute, it might enact a statute that would cover
all malpractice situations. A court interpretation incorporating the discovery doctrine
into the statute of limitations for personal injuries, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-1-1, -8
(1953), might tend to keep the exception more narrowly confined to the foreign object
situation. See Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962) ; Note, 42 Neb.
L. Rev. 180 (1962).
43. Ala. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 25(1) (1958) ; see note 9 supra.
44. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-20-1 to -2 (1953, Supp. 1963).

